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ABSTRACT
Understanding the application resilience in the presence of faults
is critical to address the HPC resilience challenge. Currently we
largely rely on random fault injection (RFI) to quantify the appli-
cation resilience. However, RFI provides lile information on how
fault tolerance happens, and RFI results are oen not determinis-
tic due to its random nature. In this paper, we introduce a new
methodology to quantify the application resilience. Our method-
ology is based on the observation that at the application level, the
application resilience to faults is due to the application-level fault
masking. e application-level fault masking happens because of
application-inherent semantics and program constructs. Based on
this observation, we analyze application execution information and
use a data-oriented approach to model the application resilience.
We use our model to study how and why HPC applications can (or
cannot) tolerate faults. We demonstrate tangible benets of using
the model to direct fault tolerance mechanisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
e high performance computing (HPC) systems are jeopardized
by potentially increasing faults in hardware and soware [45, 46].
Ensuring scientic computing integrity through the correctness of
application outcomes in the presence of faults remains one of the
grand challenges (also known as the resilience challenge) for HPC.
To address the resilience challenge, we must suciently under-
stand the resilience of hardware and applications. Understanding
the resilience of hardware is required to validate the hardware de-
sign against a desired failure rate target, and improve the eciency
of the protection used to achieve the failure rate [39, 51]. Under-
standing the resilience of applications is necessary to determine
whether the application execution can remain correct with fault
occurrences and whether we should enforce soware-based fault
tolerance mechanisms (e.g., algorithm-based fault tolerance [8, 26]
and soware-based checkpoint/restart [28]) to ensure application
result delity and minimize re-computation cost. Understanding
the resilience of applications is also the key to coordinate soware-
and hardware-based fault tolerance mechanisms [23, 30] to improve
their eciency.
Although researchers in the eld have made signicant progress
on understanding the resilience of hardware based on various
methodologies (such as (micro)architecture-level simulations [18,
33], beam test on silicon [9, 10], and AVF analysis [3, 37]), under-
standing the resilience of applications largely relies on random fault
injection (RFI) at the application level [5, 6, 31, 32, 43]. e random
fault injection injects articial faults into application variables or
computation logic, and obtains statistical comparisons of applica-
tion susceptibility to faults. To ensure statistical signicance and
sucient fault coverage, this methodology has to perform a large
amount of random fault injection tests.
However, RFI has a fundamental limitation. First, because of the
random nature of RFI, it is oen dicult to bound the accuracy of
RFI. It is dicult to know how many fault injection tests should be
performed. Dierent numbers of fault injection tests can result in
dierent conclusions on the application resilience (see Section 2).
Although previous work [29] has shown the possibility of determin-
ing the number of fault injection within specic condence level
and error level, it has to estimate the application resilience (e.g., per-
centage of faults resulting in a crash) before fault injection, which
is a priori unknown. Also, the fault injection results within the
expected error level can still be dierent from the real application
resilience [29]. Second, RFI gives us lile knowledge on how and
where faults are tolerated. Having such knowledge is important to
determine where to enforce fault tolerance mechanisms.
e limitation of RFI creates a major obstacle to implement
ecient fault tolerance mechanisms. Many fault tolerance strate-
gies, such as selective protection [17, 24] and cross-layer protec-
tion [23, 30], will be dicult to be enforced without sucient infor-
mation on the application resilience. Hence, we desire a methodol-
ogy alternative to RFI to understand the application resilience.
In this paper, we introduce a fundamentally new methodology
to quantify and model the application resilience. Our methodology
is based on an observation that at the application level, the appli-
cation resilience to faults is due to application-level fault masking.
e application-level fault masking happens because of application-
inherent semantics and program constructs. For example, a cor-
rupted bit in a data structure could be overwrien by an assignment
operation, hence does not cause incorrect application outcomes;
a corrupted bit of a molecular representation in the Monte Carlo
method-based simulation to study molecular dynamics may not
maer to application outcomes, because of the statistical nature of
the simulation.
Based on the above observation, the quantication of the appli-
cation resilience at the application level is equivalent to quantify-
ing fault masking at the application level. By analyzing the appli-
cation execution information (e.g., the architecture-independent,
LLVM [36] dynamic instruction trace), we can accurately capture
those application-level fault masking events, and provide insightful
analysis on whether there is any fault tolerance and how it happens.
In essence, RFI aempts to opportunistically capture those fault
masking events: an RFI test without causing incorrect application
outcomes captures one or more fault masking events, and is counted
to calculate the success rate (or failure rate) of all fault injection
tests. However, the random nature of RFI can miss or redundantly
count fault masking events. Depending on when and where the RFI
tests happen, dierent RFI tests can result in dierent results when
evaluating the application resilience. Our methodology avoids the
randomness, hence avoids the limitation of the traditional RFI.
To capture the application-level fault masking, we classify com-
mon fault masking events into three classes: operation-level fault
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masking, fault masking due to fault propagation, and algorithm-
level fault masking. e operation-level fault masking takes eect at
individual operations (e.g., arithmetic computation and assignment),
and broadly includes value overwriting, logical and comparison
operations, and value shadowing. e fault masking due to fault
propagation takes eect across operations, and requires tracking
data ows between operations of the application. e algorithm-
level fault masking manifests at the end of the application execution.
To identify the algorithm-level fault masking, we introduce deter-
ministic fault injection, and treat the application as a black box
without requiring detailed knowledge of the algorithm/application
internal mechanisms and semantics.
Our application-level resilience modeling opens new opportu-
nities to examine applications and evaluate the eectiveness of
application-level fault tolerance mechanisms. It is applicable to a
number of use cases to address the resilience challenge, such as
code optimization and algorithm choice. In summary, this paper
makes the following contributions:
• We introduce a novel methodology to model the appli-
cation resilience. Our methodology avoids the random-
ness inherent in the traditional random fault injection, and
brings deterministic and insightful quantication of the
application resilience, which is unprecedented.
• We comprehensively investigate application-level fault
masking events and classify them. Our investigation an-
swers a primitive question: why can an application tolerate
faults at the application level? Answering this question is
fundamental for enabling resilient applications for HPC
and designing ecient fault tolerance mechanisms.
• We introduce a set of techniques to identify fault masking
events. Furthermore, we develop a modeling tool based
on our modeling methodology and techniques. e tool
is highly congurable and extensible, making the mod-
eling work practical and exible. We apply our tool to
representative, computational algorithms and two scien-
tic applications. We reveal how fault masking typically
happens in HPC applications.
• Using one case study to determine the deployment of fault
tolerance mechanisms, we demonstrate tangible benets
of using a model-driven approach to direct fault tolerance
designs for HPC applications.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the basic fault model for the application-
level resilience modeling. We also give an introductory description
for fault masking at the application level.
2.1 Fault Model
In this paper, we model the impact of any fault on applications
at the application level, and do not consider where the faults are
originally generated (register, main memory, cache, etc). As long as
the faults manifest and are propagated to the application level, we
will model if the application is resilient to those faults. In addition,
we consider single-bit and spatial multi-bit transient faults, because
those fault paerns are the most common ones and impose a more
signicant threat than others [45, 46, 51].
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Figure 1: e random fault injection results with margins of error
for CG, MG, and LU (CLASS B) with 95% condence level.
In terms of the impact of faults on applications, we focus on the
execution correctness. We dene the execution correctness at the
application level (in contrast to the architecture level in the related
work [3, 37]). An application’s execution is deemed correct as long
as the outcome it produces is acceptable. Depending on the notion
of the outcome acceptance, the correctness can refer to precise
numerical integrity (e.g., the numerical outcome of a multiplication
operation must be precise), or refer to satisfying a minimum delity
threshold (e.g., the outcome of an iterative solver must meet certain
convergence thresholds).
2.2 Randomness of Traditional Fault Injection
e traditional fault injection injects faults randomly into the appli-
cation. e randomness results in uncertainty in the fault injection
result. To motivate our modeling work, we study the randomness
of traditional random fault injection. We leverage an LLVM-based
fault injection tool [5] and study several benchmarks from NPB
benchmark suite 3.3.1 [2]. For each fault injection test, this tool
randomly selects an instruction and then randomly ips a bit in
the output operand of the instruction. We use single-bit ip for
fault injection tests, similar to the existing work [5, 6, 31, 43]. We
use the statistical approach in [29] to quantify error level with 95%
condence level. A priori estimation of the application resilience is
0.5 suggested by [29]. We do ten sets of fault injection tests. e
number of fault injection tests in the ten sets ranges from 1000 to
10,000 with a stride of 1000.
Figure 1 shows the results, and uses the success rate of fault
injection to evaluate the application resilience, similar to [4, 31, 43].
e success rate of fault injection is dened as follows: Among N
fault injection tests, ifM of them have correct application outcomes,
then the success rate is calculated asM/N . A higher value of the
success rate indicates that the application is more resilient to faults.
Within the gure, we also show the margin of error (i.e., error level)
for the success rate based on [29].
e gure reveals that the fault injection result is sensitive to the
number of fault injection tests even with the consideration of error
level and condence level. For CG, the fault injection results are
62% for 1000 fault inject tests and 78% for 6000 fault injection tests.
Furthermore, when the number of fault injection tests is 1000, we
nd that LU is slightly more resilient than MG (0.81 for MG vs. 0.86
for LU). However, when the number of fault injection tests is 3000,
MG is more resilient than LU (0.91 for MG vs. 0.81 for LU). We make
totally dierent conclusions when comparing MG and LU. is
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observation is a clear demonstration of the randomness of using the
traditional fault injection to study the application resilience. Such
randomness comes from the limitation of the statistical approach, in
particular, a priori estimation of the application resilience, limited
condence level, and inability to capture some fault masking events.
We must have a new methodology.
2.3 Fault Masking
Fault masking can happen at the application level and hardware
level. e application level fault masking happens because of appli-
cation inherent semantics and program constructs. e hardware
level fault masking happens because a fault does not corrupt the
precise semantics of hardware. For example, branch mis-speculated
states due to branch prediction or speculative memory disambigua-
tion, if corrupted, will not cause incorrect outcome.
Our resilience modeling focuses on the application-level fault
masking, and does not include fault masking at the hardware level.
Furthermore, we use a data-oriented approach, and focus on fault
masking happened in individual data objects. In other words, we
consider that when a fault (data corruption) happens in a data ob-
ject, whether the fault can be masked. A data object can be, for
example, a matrix in matrix multiplication or a tree structure in the
Barnes-Hut N-body simulation. Using the data-oriented approach is
benecial for the resilience research, because HPC applications are
oen characterized by a large amount of data objects, and the appli-
cation outcomes are typically stored in data objects. Furthermore,
many popular fault tolerance mechanisms are designed to protect
data objects (e.g., application-level checkpoint/restart mechanisms
and many algorithm-based fault tolerance methods [8, 12, 52]).
antifying the resilience of data objects can greatly benet the
designs of these fault tolerance mechanisms. For example, if a
data object is resilient, then we do not need to apply these mech-
anisms to protect it, which will improve performance and energy
eciency. In Section 6, we have a case study to further demonstrate
the benets of our approach.
3 APPLICATION-LEVEL RESILIENCE
MODELING
is section describes our modeling methodology. We start with
a classication of the application-level fault masking, and then
introduce a metric and investigate how to use it to quantify the
application resilience.
3.1 General Description
Application-level fault masking has various representations. List-
ing 1 gives an example to illustrate the application-level fault mask-
ing. In this example, we focus on a data object, par A, which is a
sparse matrix with 1K non-zero data elements. We study fault mask-
ing happened in this data object. par A is involved in 4 statements
(Lines 6, 7, 9 and 13).
In this example, the statement at Line 6 has a fault masking event:
if a fault happened at a data element par A[0].data of the target
data object (par A), the fault can be overwrien by an assignment
operation. e statement at Line 7 has no explicit fault masking
event happened in the target data object, but if a fault at a data
element par A[2].data occurs, the fault is propagated to c by multi-
plication and assignment operations. At Line 9, assuming that the
value of c is much smaller than the value of a variable GIANT , the
impact of the corrupted c on the application outcome is ignorable.
Hence, the fault propagated from Line 7 to Line 9 can be indirectly
masked.
1 void func ( Mat r ix ∗ par A , Vec to r ∗ par b , Vec to r ∗ pa r x ) {
2 / / the data ob jec t par A has 1K data elements ;
3 f l oa t c = 0 . 0 ;
4
5 / / pre−processing par A
6 par A [ 0 ] . d a t a = s q r t ( i n i t I n f o ) ;
7 c=par A [ 2 ] . d a t a ∗ 2 ;
8 i f ( c>THR) {
9 par A [ 4 ] . d a t a =c+GIANT ; / / GIANT >> c
10 }
11
12 / / using the a lgebra i c multi−grid solve
13 AMG Sover ( par A , par b , p a r x ) ;
14 }
Listing 1: An example code to show application-level fault masking
At Line 9, there is also an explicit fault masking event (i.e., fault
overwrien by an assignment operation) forpar A[4].data if a fault
happens inpar A[4].data. is fault masking is similar to the one at
Line 6. At Line 13, there is an invocation of an algebraic multi-grid
solver (AMG) that can tolerate faults in the matrix because of the
algorithm-level semantics of AMG (particularly, AMG’s iterative,
multilevel structure [6]).
is example reveals many interesting facts. In essence, a pro-
gram can be regarded as a combination of data objects and oper-
ations performed on the data objects. An operation refers to the
arithmetic computation, assignment, logical and comparison op-
erations, or an invocation of an algorithm implementation (e.g., a
multigrid solver, a conjugate gradient method, or a Monte Carlo
simulation). An operation may inherently come with fault mask-
ing eects, exemplied at Line 6 (fault overwrien); An operation
may propagate faults, exemplied at Line 7. Dierent operations
have dierent fault masking eects, and hence impact the applica-
tion outcome dierently. Dierent applications can have dierent
operations because of algorithm implementation and compiler opti-
mization, hence the applications can have dierent application-level
resilience.
Based on the above discussion, we classify application-level fault
masking into three classes.
(1) Operation-level fault masking. At individual operations,
a fault happened in a data object is masked because of the semantics
of the operations. Line 6 in Listing 1 is an example.
(2) Faultmasking due to fault propagation. Some fault mask-
ing events are implicit and have to be identied beyond a single
operation. In particular, a corrupted bit in a data object is not
masked in the current operation (e.g., Line 7 in Listing 1), but the
fault is propagated to another data object and masked in another
operation (e.g., Line 9). Note that simply relying on the operation-
level analysis without the fault propagation analysis is not sucient
to recognize these fault masking events.
(3) Algorithm-level fault masking. Identication of some
faultmasking events happened in a data objectmust include algorithm-
level information. e identication of those events is beyond the
3
rst two classes. Examples of such events include the multigrid
solver [6], some iterative methods [41], and certain sorting algo-
rithm [43]. Furthermore, some application domains, such as image
processing and machine learning [35], can also tolerate faults be-
cause of less strict requirements on the correctness of data values.
In general, the rst two classes are caused by program constructs,
and the third class is caused by algorithm semantics. Due to the
random nature, the traditional random fault injection may omit
some fault masking events, or capture them multiple times. Relying
on analytical modeling, we can avoid or control the randomness of
the fault injection, hence greatly improve resilience evaluation.
Our resilience modeling is analytical, and relies on the quanti-
cation of the above application-level fault masking events happened
on data objects. We create a new metric to quantify the application-
level resilience at data objects, and introduce methods to measure
the metric based on the above classication of fault masking events.
3.2 aDVF: An Application-Level Resilience
Metric
To quantify the resilience of a data object due to fault masking
events, we could simply count the number of fault masking events
that happen to the target data object. However, a direct resilience
comparison between data objects in terms of the number of fault
masking events cannot provide meaningful quantication of the
resilience of data objects. For example, a data object may be in-
volved in a lot of fault masking events, but this does not necessarily
mean this data object is more resilient to faults than other data
objects with fewer fault masking events, because the fault masking
events of this data object can come from a few repeated operations,
and the number of fault masking events is accumulated throughout
application execution; is data object could be not resilient, if
most of other operations for this data object do not have fault mask-
ing. Hence, the key to quantifying the resilience of a data object
is to quantify how oen fault masking happens to the data object.
We introduce a new metric, aDVF (i.e., the application-level Data
Vulnerability Factor), to quantify application-inherent resilience
due to fault masking in data objects. aDVF is dened as follows.
For an operation performed on a data element of a data object, we
reason that if a fault happens at the data element in this operation,
the application outcome could or could not remain correct in terms
of the outcome value and application semantics. If the fault does
not cause an incorrect application outcome, then a fault masking
event happens to the target data object. A single operation can
operate on one or more data elements of the target data object.
For a specic operation, aDVF of the target data object is dened
as the total number of fault masking events divided by the total
number of data elements of the target data object operated on by
the operation.
For example, an assignment operationa[1] = w happens to a data
object, the array a. is operation involves one data element (a[1])
of the data object a. We calculate aDVF for the target data object a
in this operation as follows. If a fault happens to a[1], we deduce
that the erroneous a[1] does not impact application correctness
and the fault in a[1] is always masked. Hence, the number of fault
masking events for the target data object a in this operation is 1.
Also, the total number of data elements involved in the operation is
1. Hence, the aDVF value for the target data object in this addition
operation is 1/1 = 1.
Based on the above discussion, the denition of aDVF for a data
object X in an operation (aDVFXop ) is formulated in Equation 1,
where xi is a data element of the target data object X , and m is
the number of data elements operated on by the operation; f is a
function to count fault masking events happened on a data element.
aDV FXop =
m−1∑
i=0
f (xi )/m (1)
e calculation of aDVF for a code segment is similar to the
above for an operation, except that m is the total number of x
involved in all operations of the code segment. To further explain
it, we use as an example a code segment from LU benchmark in
SNU NPB benchmark suite 1.0.3 (a C-based implementation of the
Fortran-based NPB) shown in Listing 2.
1 void l2norm ( in t ldx , in t ldy , in t l dz , in t nx0 , \
2 in t ny0 , in t nz0 , in t i s t , in t iend , in t j s t , \
3 in t jend , double v [ ] [ l dy / 2 ∗ 2 + 1 ] [ l dx / 2 ∗ 2 + 1 ] [ 5 ] , \
4 double sum [ 5 ] )
5 {
6 in t i , j , k , m;
7 for (m=0 ;m<5;m++) / / the f i r s t loop
8 sum[m] = 0 . 0 ; / / Statement A
9
10 for ( k =1 ; k<nz0 −1 ; k++){ / / the second loop
11 for ( j = j s t ; j<j end ; j ++){
12 for ( i = i s t ; i<i end ; i ++){
13 for (m=0 ;m<5 ,m++){
14 sum[m]=sum[m]+v [ k ] [ j ] [ i ] [m] \
15 ∗ v [ k ] [ j ] [ i ] [m] ; / / Statement B
16 }
17 }
18 }
19 }
20
21 for (m=0 ;m<5;m++){ / / the third loop
22 sum[m]= s q r t ( sum[m] / ( ( nx0 −2) ∗ \
23 ( ny0 −2) ∗ ( nz0 −2) ) ) ; / / Statement C
24 }
25 }
Listing 2: A code segment from LU.
An example from LU.We calculate aDVF for the array sum[].
Statement A has an assignment operation involving one data ele-
ment (sum[m]) and one fault masking event (i.e., if a fault happens
to sum[m], the fault is overwrien by the assignment). Considering
that there are ve iterations in the rst loop (iternum1 = 5), there
are 5 fault masking events happened in 5 data elements of sum[]
Statement B has two operations related to sum[] (i.e., an as-
signment and an addition). e assignment operation involves
one data element (sum[m]) and one fault masking; the addition
operation involves one data element (sum[m]) and one potential
fault masking (i.e., certain corruptions in sum[m] can be ignored, if
(v[k][j][i][m] ∗ v[k][j][i][m]) is signicantly larger than sum[m]).
is potential fault masking is counted as r ′ (0 ≤ r ′ ≤ 1), depending
on where a corruption happens in sum[m] and fault propagation
analysis result (see Sections 3.3 and 4 for further discussion). Consid-
ering the loop structure, there are ((1+r ′)∗iternum2) fault masking
events happened in (2 ∗ iternum2) elements of sum[], where “1” and
“r ′” come from the assignment and addition operations respectively.
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Figure 2: Calculating aDVF for a target data object, the array sum[]
in a code segment fromLU. In the gure, iternum1 = 5, iternum3 = 5
and iternum2 = (nz0 − 2) ∗ (jend − jst ) ∗ (iend − ist ) ∗ 5.
iternum2 is the number of iterations in the second loop, which is
equal to ((nz0 − 2) ∗ (jend − jst) ∗ (iend − jst) ∗ 5).
Statement C has two operations related to sum[] (i.e., an assign-
ment and a division), but only the assignment operation has fault
masking. Considering that there are 5 iterations in the third loop
(iternum3 = 5), there are 5 fault masking events happened on 5 data
elements of the target data object in the third loop. In summary,
the aDVF calculation for sum[] is shown in Figure 2.
To calculate aDVF for a data object, we must rely on eective
identication and counting of fault masking events (i.e., the function
f ). In Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, we introduce a series of counting
methods based on the classication of fault masking events.
3.3 Operation-Level Analysis
To identify fault masking events at the operation level, we ana-
lyze all possible operations. In particular, we analyze architecture-
independent, LLVM instructions and characterize them based on
the instruction result sensitivity to corrupted operands. We classify
the operation-level fault masking as follows.
(1)Value overwriting. An operationwrites a new value into the
target data object, and the fault in the target data object is masked.
For example, the store operation overwrites the fault in the store
destination. We also include trunc and bit-shiing operations into
this category, because the fault can be truncated or shied away in
those operations.
(2) Logical and comparison operations. If a fault in the target
data object does not change the correctness of logical and compari-
son operations, the fault is masked. Examples of such operations
include logical AND and the predicate expression in a switch state-
ment.
(3) Value shadowing. If the corrupted data value in an operand
of an operation is shadowed by other correct operands involved
in the operation, then the corrupted data has an ignorable impact
on the correctness of the operation. e addition operation at
Line 9 in Figure 1 is such an example. We can nd many other
examples, such as arithmetic multiplication. e eectiveness of
value shadowing is coupled with the application semantics. An
operation of 1000 + 0.0012 can be treated as equal to 1000 + 0.0011
without impacting the execution correctness of application, while
such tiny dierence in the two data values may be intolerable
in a dierent application. We will discuss how to identify value
shadowing in details in Section 4.
Since we focus on the application-level resilience modeling, we
do not consider those LLVM instructions that do not have directly
corresponding operations at the application statement level for fault
masking analysis. Examples of those instructions include getele-
mentptr (geing the address of a sub-element of an aggregate data
structure) and phi (implementing the ϕ node in the SSA graph [36]).
e eectiveness of the operation-level fault masking heavily
relies on the fault paern. e fault paern is dened by how fault
bits are distributed within a faulty data element (e.g., single-bit
vs. spatial multiple-bit, least signicant bit vs. most signicant
bit, mantissa vs. exponent). To account for the eects of various
fault paerns, an ideal method to count fault masking events would
be to collect fault paerns in a production environment during
a suciently long time period, and then use the realistic fault
paerns to guide fault masking analysis. However, this method
is not always practical. In the practice of our resilience modeling,
we enumerate possible fault paerns for a given operation, and
derive the existence of fault masking for each fault paern. Suppose
there are n fault paerns, andm (0 ≤ m ≤ n) of which have fault
masking happened. en, the number of fault masking events is
calculated asm/n, which is a statistical quantication of possible
fault masking. Using this statistical quantication means that the
number of fault masking events can be non-integer. We employ the
above enumeration analysis to model fault masking for single-bit
faults in our evaluation section, but the method of the enumeration
analysis can be applied to analyze all fault paerns.
3.4 Fault Propagation Analysis
At an operation performed on the target data object, if a fault
happened in the target data object cannot be masked at the cur-
rent operation, then we use the fault propagation analysis to track
whether the corrupted data is propagated to other data object(s) and
the faults (including the original one and the new ones propagated
to other data object(s)) are masked in the successor operations. If
all of the faults are masked, then we claim that the original fault
happened in the target data object is masked.
For the fault propagation analysis, a big challenge is to track all
contaminated data which can quickly increase as the fault propa-
gates. Tracking a large number of contaminated data objects largely
increases analysis time and memory usage. To handle the above
fault propagation problem, we avoid tracking fault propagation
along a long chain of operations to accelerate the analysis. We
introduce an optimization technique to avoid long tracking.
Optimization: bounding propagation path. We take a sam-
ple of the whole fault propagation path. In particular, we only
track the rst k operations. If the original fault and the new faults
propagated to other data object(s) cannot be masked within the
rst k operations, then we conclude that all of the faults will not
be masked aer the k operations.
is method, as an analysis approximation, could introduce anal-
ysis inaccuracy because of the sampling nature of the method. How-
ever, for a fault that propagates to a large amount of data objects,
bounding the fault propagation path does not cause inaccurate anal-
ysis, because given a large amount of corrupted data, it is highly
unlikely that all faults are masked, and making a conclusion of no
fault masking is correct in most cases. In the evaluation section, we
explore the sensitivity of analysis correctness to the length of the
fault propagation path (i.e., k). We nd that seing the propagation
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path to 10 is good to achieve accurate resilience modeling in most
cases (87.5% of all cases). Seing it to 50 is good for all cases.
3.5 Algorithm-Level Analysis
Identifying the algorithm-level fault masking demands domain
and algorithm knowledge. In our resilience modeling, we want to
minimize the usage of domain and algorithm knowledge, such that
the modeling methodology can be general across dierent domains.
We use the following strategy to identify the algorithm-level
fault masking (see the next paragraph). Furthermore, the user can
optionally provide a threshold to indicate a satisable solution
quality. For example, for an iterative solver such as conjugate
gradient and successive over relaxation, this threshold can be the
threshold that governs the convergence of the algorithms. For
the support vector machine algorithm (an articial intelligence
algorithm), this threshold can be a percentage (e.g., 5%) of result
dierence aer the fault corruption. Working hand-in-hand, the
strategy (see the next paragraph) and user-dened threshold treat
the algorithm as a black box without requiring detailed knowledge
of the algorithm internal mechanisms and semantics. We explain
the strategy as follows.
A practical strategy for algorithm-level analysis: deter-
ministic fault injection. e traditional random fault injection
treats the program as a black-box. Hence, using the traditional
random fault injection could be an eective tool to identify the
algorithm-level fault masking. However, to avoid the limitation of
the traditional random fault injection (i.e., randomness), we use
the operation-level analysis and fault propagation analysis to guide
fault injection, without blindly enforcing fault injection as the tradi-
tional method. In particular, when we cannot determine whether a
fault masking can happen in the target data object for an operation
op because of fault propagation, we track fault propagation until
reaching the boundary of the fault propagation analysis. If we still
cannot determine fault masking at the boundary, then we inject a
fault into the target data object in op, and then run the application
to completion. If the application result is dierent from the fault-
free result, but does not go beyond the user-dened threshold, we
claim that the algorithm-level fault masking takes eect.
Discussion: coupling between fault propagation and algo-
rithm level analysis.e fault propagation analysis and algorithm-
level analysis are tightly coupled. If we reach the boundary of
the fault propagation analysis and cannot determine fault mask-
ing, we use the algorithm-level analysis. However, by doing this,
some of the fault masking events due to the fault propagation and
operation-level fault masking aer the boundary may be accounted
as algorithm-level fault masking. Although this mis-counting will
not impact the correctness of aDVF value, it would overestimate
the algorithm-level fault masking.
e fundamental reason for the above overestimation is that we
bound the boundary of the fault propagation analysis. However,
our study (Section 5.2) reveals that we can have very good modeling
accuracy on our count of the algorithm level fault masking, even if
we set the boundary of the fault propagation analysis. e reason is
as follows. Aer the boundary of the fault propagation analysis, the
fault is widely propagated, and the chance to mask all propagated
faults by the operation-level fault masking is extremely low. In fact,
in our tests, we found that even if we use a longer fault propagation
path to identify fault masking, we are not able to nd more fault
masking based on the fault propagation analysis. Hence, as long as
the threshold is suciently large (e.g., 10), we do not overestimate
the algorithm-level fault masking.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
To calculate the aDVF value for a data object, we develop a tool,
named ARAT (standing for Application-level Resilience Analysis
Tool). Figure 3 shows the tool framework. ARAT has three compo-
nents: an application trace generator, a trace analysis tool, and a
deterministic fault injector.
e application trace generator is an LLVM instrumentation
pass to generate a dynamic LLVM IR trace. LLVM IR is architecture
independent, and each instruction in the IR trace corresponds to one
operation. e trace includes dynamic register values and memory
addresses referenced in each operation. e current trace generator
is based on a third-party tool [42], but with some extensions for
the deterministic fault injection and Phi instruction processing to
identify ambiguous branches.
e trace analysis tool is the core of ARAT. Using an applica-
tion trace as input, the tool calculates the aDVF value of a given data
object. In particular, the trace analysis tool conducts the operation-
level and fault propagation analysis. Also, for those unresolved
fault propagation analyses that reach the boundary of the fault prop-
agation analysis, the trace analysis tool will output a set of fault
injection information for the deterministic fault injection. Such
information includes dynamic instruction IDs, IDs of the operands
that reference the target data object, and the bit locations of the
operands that have undetermined fault masking. Aer the fault
injection results (i.e., the existence of algorithm-level fault masking
or not) are available from the deterministic fault injector, we re-run
the trace analysis tool, and use the fault injection results to address
the unresolved analyses and update the aDVF calculation.
For the fault propagation analysis, we associate data semantics
(the data object name) with the data values in registers, such that
we can identify the data of the target data object in registers. is is
necessary to analyze fault propagation. To associate data semantics
with the data in registers, ARAT tracks the register allocation when
analyzing the trace, such that we can know at any moment which
registers have the data of the target data object.
For the value shadowing analysis to determine which bits can
have their bit ips masked, we ask users to provide a set of value
shadowing thresholds, each of which denes a boundary (either
upper bound or lower bound) of valid data values for a data element
of the target data object. Only those bit positions whose bit ips
result in a valid data value are determined to have the fault masking
of value shadowing. If users cannot provide such thresholds, then
we will perform deterministic fault injection test for each bit of the
data element of the target data object to determine the eect of bit
ip on the application outcome. To accelerate the value shadowing
analysis, we further introduce a series of optimization techniques,
such as (1) using the deterministic fault injection results for higher-
order bits to deduce the fault injection results for lower-order bits;
(2) leveraging iterative structure of the application; and (3) analysis
parallelization. ose implementation details can be found in our
technical report [48].
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Figure 3: ARAT, a tool for application-level resilience modeling based on the aDVF analysis
e trace analysis tool is congurable and extensible. It gives
the user exibility to control the trace analysis. For example, the
user can dene a maximum fault propagation length for the fault
propagation analysis; the user can also congure fault paerns for
analysis. Based on the user conguration, the tool can enumerate
all fault paerns during the analysis or just examine one specic
paern. To make the trace analysis tool extensible for future im-
provement, the tool also exposes APIs that allow users to hook up
new techniques to identify fault masking and optimize analysis.
e deterministic fault injector is a tool to capture the algo-
rithm level fault masking for the trace analysis tool. e input to
the deterministic fault injector is a list of fault injection points gen-
erated by the trace analysis tool for those unresolved fault masking
analyses. Each fault injection point includes a dynamic instruction
ID, the ID of the operand that references the target data object,
and a specic bit-position of the operand for bit ipping (i.e., the
fault injection). e bit-positions of the operand for bit ipping are
determined aer the value shadowing analysis.
Similar to the application trace generation, the deterministic fault
injector is also based on the LLVM instrumentation. We use the
LLVM instrumentation to count dynamic instructions and trigger
bit ips. Aer the LLVM instrumentation, the application execution
will trigger bit ip when a fault injection point is encountered.
5 EVALUATION
We study 12 data objects from six benchmarks of the NAS parallel
benchmark (NPB) suite (we use SNU NPB-1.0.3) and 4 data objects
from two scientic applications. ose data objects are chosen
to be representative: they have various data access paerns and
participate in various execution phases. For those benchmarks and
applications, we use their default compiler options, and use gcc 4.7.3
and LLVM 3.4.2 for trace generation. To count the algorithm-level
fault masking, we use the default convergence thresholds (or the
fault tolerance levels) for those benchmarks. Table 1 gives detailed
information on the benchmarks and applications. e maximum
fault propagation path for aDVF analysis is set to 10 by default.
5.1 Resilience Modeling Results
Figure 4 shows the aDVF results and breaks them down into the
three levels (i.e., the operation-level, fault propagation level, and
algorithm-level). Figure 5 shows the results for the analyses at the
levels of the operation and fault propagation, and further breaks
down the results into the three classes (i.e., the value overwriting,
logical and comparison operations, and value shadowing). We have
multiple interesting ndings from the results.
(1) Fault masking is common across benchmarks and applica-
tions. Several data objects (e.g., r in CG, and exp1 and plane in FT)
have aDVF values close to 1 in Figure 4, which indicates that most
of operations working on these data objects have fault masking.
However, a couple of data objects have much less intensive fault
masking. For example, the aDVF value of colidx in CG is 0.28 (Fig-
ure 4). Further study reveals that colidx is an array to store column
indexes of sparse matrices, and there is few operation-level or fault
propagation-level fault masking (Figure 5). e corruption of it
can easily cause segmentation fault caught by the algorithm-level
analysis. дrid points in SP and BT also have a relatively small aDVF
value (0.14 and 0.38 for SP and BT respectively in Figure 4). Further
study reveals that дrid points denes input problems for SP and BT.
A small corruption of дrid points can easily cause major changes
in computation caught by the fault propagation analysis.
e data object u in BT also has a relatively small aDVF value
(0.82 in Figure 4). Further study reveals that u is read-only in our
target code region for matrix factorization and Jacobian, neither of
which is friendly for fault masking. Furthermore, the major fault
masking for u comes from value shadowing, and value shadowing
only happens in a couple of the least signicant bits of the operands
that reference u, which further reduces the value of aDVF.
(2) e data type is strongly correlated with fault masking. Fig-
ure 4 reveals that the integer data objects (colidx in CG, дrid points
in BT and SP,m elemBC in LULESH) appear to be more sensitive
to faults than the oating point data objects (u and r in MG, exp1
and plane in FT, u and rsd in LU, m delv zeta in LULESH, and
rhoi in SP). In HPC applications, the integer data objects are com-
monly employed to dene input problems and bound computation
boundaries (e.g., colidx in CG and дrid points in BT), or track com-
putation status (e.g., m elemBC in LULESH). eir corruption is
very detrimental to the application correctness.
(3) Operation-level fault masking is very common. For many
data objects, the operation-level fault masking contributes more
than 70% of the aDVF values. For r in CG, exp1 in FT, and rhoi in
SP, the contribution of the operation-level fault masking is close to
99% (Figure 4).
Furthermore, the value shadowing is a very common operation
level fault masking, especially for oating point data objects (e.g.,
u and r in BT,m delv zeta in LULESH, and rhoi in SP in Figure 5).
is nding has a very important indication for studying the appli-
cation resilience. In particular, the values of a data object can be
dierent across dierent input problems. If the values of the data
object are dierent, then the number of fault masking events due
to the value shadowing will be dierent. Hence, we deduce that the
application resilience can be correlated with the input problems,
because of the correlation between the value shadowing and input
problems. We must consider the input problems when studying
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Table 1: Benchmarks and applications for the study of the application-level resilience
Name Benchmark description Execution phase for evaluation Target data objects
CG (NPB) Conjugate Gradient, irregular memory access (input class S) e routine conj grad in the main computation loop e arrays r and col idx
MG (NPB) Multi-Grid on a sequence of meshes (input class S) e routine mg3P in the main computation loop e arrays u and r
FT (NPB) Discrete 3D fast Fourier Transform (input class S) e routine XYZ in the main computation loop e arrays plane and exp1
BT (NPB) Block Tri-diagonal solver (input class S) e routine x solve in the main computation loop e arrays дr id points andu
SP (NPB) Scalar Penta-diagonal solver (input class S) e routine x solve in the main computation loop e arrays rhoi and
дr id points
LU (NPB) Lower-Upper Gauss-Seidel solver (input class S) e routine ssor e arrays u and r sd
LULESH [27] Unstructured Lagrangian explicit shock hydrodynamics (input 5x5x5) e routine CalcMonotonicQRegionForElems e arrays m elemBC and
m delv zeta
AMG2013 [22] An algebraic multigrid solver for linear systems arising from problems on unstructured grids (we use
GMRES(10) with AMG preconditioner). We use a compact version from LLNL with input matrix aniso .
e routine hypre GMRESSolve e arrays ipiv andA
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the application resilience. is conclusion is consistent with a very
recent work [20].
(4) e contribution of the algorithm-level fault masking to the
application resilience can be nontrivial. For example, the algorithm-
level fault masking contributes 19% of the aDVF value for u in
MG and 27% for plane in FT (Figure 4). e large contribution of
algorithm-level fault masking in MG is consistent with the results
of existing work [6]. For FT (particularly 3D FFT), the large contri-
bution of algorithm-level fault masking in plane (Figure 4) comes
from frequent transpose and 1D FFT computations that average
out or overwrite the data corruption. CG, as an iterative solver, is
known to have the algorithm-level fault masking because of the
iterative nature [41]. Interestingly, the algorithm-level fault mask-
ing in CG contributes most to the resilience of colidx which is a
vulnerable integer data object (Figure 4).
(5) Fault masking at the fault propagation level is small. For all
data objects, the contribution of the fault masking at the level of
fault propagation is less than 5% (Figure 4). For 6 data objects (r
and colidx in CG, дrid points and u in BT, and дrid points and rhoi
in SP), there is no fault masking at the level of fault propagation.
In combination with the nding 4, we conclude that once the fault
is propagated, it is dicult to mask it because of the contamination
of more data objects aer fault propagation, and only the algorithm
semantics can tolerate propagated faults well.
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(6) Fault masking by logical and comparison operations is small,
comparing with the contributions of value shadowing and overwrit-
ing (Figure 5). Among all data objects, the logical and comparison
operations in дrid points in BT contribute the most (25% contri-
bution in Figure 6), because of intensive ICmp operations (integer
comparison).
(7)e resilience varies across data objects. is fact is especially
pronounced in two data objects colidx and r in CG (Figure 4). colidx
has aDVF much smaller than r , which means colidx is much less
resilient than r (see nding 1 for a detailed analysis on colidx ). Fur-
thermore, colidx and r have dierent algorithm-level fault masking
(see nding 4 for a detailed analysis).
To further investigate the reasons for fault masking, we break
down the aDVF results at the granularity of LLVM instructions,
based on the analyses at the levels of operation and fault propaga-
tion. e results are shown in Figure 6.
(8) Arithmetic operations make a lot of contributions to fault
masking. For r in CG, u in BT, plane and exp1 in FT, m elemBC
in LULESH, arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, and
division) contribute to almost 100% of the fault masking (Figure 6).
5.2 Sensitivity Study
ARAT uses 10 as the default fault propagation analysis threshold.
e fault propagation analysis will not go beyond 10 operations.
Instead, we will use deterministic fault injection aer 10 opera-
tions. In this section, we study the impact of this threshold on
the modeling accuracy. We use a range of threshold values and
examine how the aDVF value varies and whether the identication
of fault masking varies. Figure 7 shows the results for multiple data
objects in CG, BT, and SP. We perform the sensitivity study for all
16 data objects. Due to the page space limitation, we only show
the results for three data objects, but we summarize the sensitivity
study results for all data objects in this section.
Our results reveal that the identication of fault masking by
tracking fault propagation is not signicantly aected by the fault
propagation analysis threshold. Even if we use a rather large thresh-
old (50), the variation of aDVF values is 4.48% on average among all
data objects, and the variation at each of the three levels of analysis
(the operation level, fault propagation level, and algorithm level) is
less than 5.2% on average. In fact, using a threshold value of 5 is
suciently accurate in most of the cases (14 out of 16 data objects).
is result is consistent with our nding 5 (i.e., fault masking at the
fault propagation level is small). However, we do nd a data object
(m elementBC in LULESH) showing relatively high-sensitive (up
to 15% variation) to the threshold. For this uncommon data object,
using 50 as the fault propagation path is sucient.
6 CASE STUDY: OPTIMIZING FAULT
TOLERANCE FOR APPLICATIONS
aDVF and its analysis are widely applicable to a number of use cases,
such as code optimization and algorithm choice. In this section,
we study a case of using aDVF to help system designers to decide
whether a specic application-level fault tolerance mechanism is
helpful to improve the application resilience.
Application-level fault tolerance mechanisms, such as algorithm-
based fault tolerance [7, 13, 14, 26, 30, 52] and compiler-directed
redundant execution [25, 38, 40, 49, 55], are extensively studied
as a means to increase application resilience to faults. However,
those application-level fault tolerance mechanisms can come with
big performance and energy overheads (e.g., 35% performance loss
for dense matrix factorization in small scale deployments [15] and
41% performance loss for compiler-directed instruction duplica-
tion [38]). To justify the necessity of using these mechanisms, we
must quantify how eectively those mechanisms improve the ap-
plication resilience. However, it is challenging to do so without
a resilience metric and quantitative analysis method. With the
introduction of aDVF, we can evaluate if the application resilience
is eectively improved with fault tolerance mechanisms in place.
In this section, we focus on a specic application-level fault
tolerance mechanism, the algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT)
for general matrix multiplication (C = A × B) [52]. is ABFT
mechanism encodes matricesA, B into a new form with checksums
shown in the following equation, and protect C . e in the equation
is an all-one column checksum vector.
Ar :=
[
A
eT A
]
, Bc :=
[
B Be
]
To protect the result matrix C from faults, instead of multiplying
matrices A by B, we use their checksum version.
Ar Bc =
[
AB ABe
eT AB eT ABe
]
=
[
C Ce
eTC eTCe
]
=: C f
e new result matrix Cf has extra checksum information, shown
as above. e extra checksum information can be used to detect,
locate, and recover fault during computation. If a fault occurs in an
element ofC , exactly one row and one column of the result will not
satisfy the checksum matrix denition. en, leveraging either the
row or column checksum, we are able to correct the faulty element.
We apply the aDVF analysis on this ABFT, and the matrix C is
the target data object. We compare the aDVF values of C with and
without ABFT. Figure 8 shows the results. e gure shows that
ABFT eectively improves the resilience of the matrix C : the aDVF
value increases from 0.0172 to 0.82. e improvement mostly comes
from the value overwriting at the fault propagation level. is result
is expected, because an element of C , once a fault happens in it, is
not corrected by ABFT right way. Instead, it will be corrected in a
specic verication phase of ABFT.
Given the eectiveness of this ABFT, we further explore whether
this ABFT can help us improve the resilience of data objects in an
application, AMG. AMG frequently employs matrix-vector multi-
plication. Given the fact that the vector can be treated as a special
matrix, we can apply ABFT to protect the result vectors for those
matrix-vector multiplications. In particular, we protect a specic
data object, the vector r , because this vector works as a result vector
for 75% of matrix-vector multiplications in AMG. Using the vector
r as our target data object, we perform the aDVF analysis with and
without ABFT. We want to answer a question: Will using ABFT be
an eective fault tolerance mechanism for AMG?
Figure 9 shows the results. e gure reveals that using ABFT
is not very helpful to improve the resilience of the data object r
in AMG: there is only a slightly change to the aDVF value. Aer
examining the AMG code, we found that the vector r is involved
in a generalized minimal residual method (GMRES). is method
approximates the solution of a linear equation by a vector with
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minimal residual. e approximation nature of GMRES determines
that the GMRES method itself can tolerate faults. For the vector
r , most of the faults correctable by ABFT are also tolerable by
GMRES. Hence, ABFT is not very helpful to improve the application
resilience. Our aDVF analysis result is consistent with the above
code analysis result. Furthermore, Figure 9 reveals that how faults
are masked in AMG with and without ABFT. With ABFT, most
faults are masked at the fault propagation level, while without
ABFT most faults are masked at the algorithm level.
is case study is a clear demonstration of how powerful the
aDVF analysis can help optimize fault tolerance. Avoiding redun-
dant protection as above will greatly improve performance and
energy eciency of HPC systems.
7 RELATEDWORK
Application-level random fault injection. Casa et al. [6] study
the resilience of an algebraic multi-grid solver by injecting faults
into instructions’ output based on LLVM. Similar work can be found
in [5, 43]. Cher et al. [10] employ a GDB-like debugging tool to
corrupt register states. Li et al. [31] build a binary instrumentation-
based fault injection tool for random fault injection. Shantharam
et al. [41] manually change the values of data objects to study
the resilience of iterative methods. Ashraf et al. [1] and Wei et
al. [50] also use LLVM-based tools to inject faults, but they further
introduce the functionality of tracking fault propagation. Xu et
al. [53] and Hari et al. [21] aggressively employ static and dynamic
program analyses to reduce the number of fault injection tests.
eir work still has randomness for fault injection.
Resilience metrics. Architectural vulnerability factor (AVF) is
a hardware-oriented metric to quantify the probability of a fault in
a hardware component resulting in the incorrect nal application
outcome. It was rst introduced in [3, 37], and then aracted a
series of follow-up work. is includes statistical-based modeling
techniques to accelerate AVF estimate [11, 16, 19], online AVF esti-
mation [34, 44], and AVF analysis for spatial multi-bit faults [51].
Another metric, the program vulnerability factor (PVF) is based on
AVF [47], but eliminates microarchitecture eects.
AVF calculation and its variants are highly hardware-oriented.
In fact, AVF presents an aggregation eect of hardware and applica-
tion, but is typically employed to evaluate the hardware vulnerabil-
ity. AVF calculation usually requires detailed hardware simulations,
and requires a large number of simulations to derive insight into
the impact of (micro)architectural events on AVF, which can be
time-consuming. Although the recent work based on statistical ap-
proaches improves evaluation speed [11, 16, 19], it limits modeling
accuracy. AVF calculation does not consider application semantics,
and hence can overestimate vulnerability. Yu et al. [54] introduce
a metric, DVF. DVF captures the eects of both application and
hardware on the resilience of data structures. In contrast to AVF
and DVF, our metric, aDVF, is a highly application-oriented metric.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
is paper introduces a new methodology to quantify the applica-
tion resilience. Dierent from the traditional random fault injection,
our methodology employs a direct measurement of fault masking
events inherent in applications. Based on our methodology, we
introduce a new metric, a series of techniques, and a tool to analyze
and identify error masking. We hope that our methodology and
tool can make the quantication of application resilience a common
practice for evaluating applications in the future.
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